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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Plaintiff-Appellee adopt the jurisdictional statement in 
Defendants-Appellants' brief. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Plaintiff-Appellee adopt the standard of review in 
Defendants-Appellants' brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Prior to, and at the time of the defamatory 
publications complained of, the plaintiff-appefri^nt Terry West 
was elected Mayor of LaVerkin, Utah. At such time the defendant-
raspondent, The Daily Spectrum was, and still is a daily 
newspaper doing business in several counties in the State of 
Utah, and at such time the defendant-respondent Don Hogun was, 
and still is, the publisher/general manager of The Daily Spectrum 
with the authority to determine what news articles might appear 
or be withheld from publication, and has the responsibility to 
oversee whatever goes on in the newspaper. (dep. Hogun 5 3-13 
and 17 .20-24) And at such time the defendant-resqaeadeat Goodey 
was, the managing editor of The Daily Spectrum, and had the 
authority to determine what news articles might appear or be 
withheld from publication and was directly responsible for giving 
the reporters assignments and direction. (dep. Hogun 10 25 to 11 
25) And at such time the defendant Rick Guldan was, a reporter 
for The Daily Spectrum. (Third Amended Complaint R 224 at #9) 
At the time of the November 3, 1988 election, when the 
plaintiff-app^y^Ht Terry West was elected as Mayor of LaVerkin 
1 
City, there was a controversy in the city over municipal power. 
The issue of municipal power was very much a political issue and 
many votes were cast just on the position the candidate was 
taking on the issue. (Third Amended Complaint R 224 #10) 
On June 27, 1988, and July 2, 1988, the defendants-
respondents, published or caused to be published, two of the 
three articles complained of. (Brief of Appellants Appendix D & 
G) Judge Eves found, among other things, that the statements in 
the two articles relating to the plaintiff's change of position 
on the municipal power issue were defamatory since it's 
connotation was that the plaintiff-ap~p©l±»nt espoused opposition 
to municipal power to get elected. (R 353-354) However, Judge 
Eves granted to the defendants and against the plaintiff that 
portion of the Summary Judgment^ relating to the cause of action 
in each of the two articles therein Plaintiff is alleged to have 
changed his position regarding the issue of municipal power, 
because he found that those statements are constitutionally 
protected expressions of opinion, (R 3 60) and that they do not 
contain a provable false factual connotation. (R 421) The court 
also held that plaintiff-appellee failed to marshall sufficient 
evidence to prove "actual malice" against defendants Hogun and 
Goodey. (R 366 and 268) The defendants Rick Guldan and Thomson 
Newspaper were left as parties to the first cause of action as to 
the statements concerning the insurance claim filed by plaintiff-
appellee Terry West. (R 374) 
On November 20, 1988, all the defendants-appellants, except 
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Rick Guldan, published or caused to be published, another article 
alleging that the Plaintiff-Appellee had repeatedly attempted to 
manipulate the press, (defendants-appellant brief Appendix H) 
However, Judge Eves dismissed all defendants-appellants, from the 
third cause of action, holding, that the statement accusing the 
plaintiff-appellee of attempting to manipulate the press, could 
not in the minds of any reasonable jury be found defamatory under 
Utah Law. (R 102). 
The Plaintiff-Appellee appealed the trial court holdings to 
the Utah Court of Appeals. The majority opinion of the Court of 
Appeals held (a) that the statements by columnist Guldan inferred 
that the mayor opposed municipal power to get elected; (West, 835 
P.2d at 183-87) and (b) that the statements contained a provable 
factual connotation and therefore, were not constitutionally 
protected opinion under the U.S. Constitution; id., and (c) that 
summary judgment for publisher Hogun and editor Goodey was proper 
with respect to the June column, but improper with respect to the 
July column, because the plaintiff had marshalled enough evidence 
of actual malice on the part of Hogun and Goodey to create a 
question of fact for the jury (id. at 187-89) ; and (d) that 
Goodey,s accusation in the November column that the Mayor 
repeatedly attempted to manipulate the press was susceptible of a 
defamatory meaning under Utah law and thus created a jury issue, 
(id. at 189-90) 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
Plaintiff-Appellee adopt the statement of material facts 
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as set forth in paragraphs 1-29 on pages 6-13 of Defendants-
Appellants' brief and object to paragraph 8 and 28 which are 
contested issues of fact. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
P O I N T I. THE STATEMENTS AT ISSUE ARE NOT CQNSTTTUTTONAT.T.V 
PROTECTED EXPRESSIONS OF OPINION UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT. 
In the June article, the Defendant Guldan wrote, 
" . . . Terry West, when running for mayor, was opposed to it 
(municipal power). However, the first thing West did as 
mayor was . . . . reactivated the municipal power issue. 
(Defendants' brief Appendix "D")" 
The trial court found that these statements were defamatory 
because, 
"This allegation of a change in position was made 
following a hotly contested election in a small 
community where candidates lost or won depending upon 
their announced position regarding municipal power." 
(R. 343) 
and under these circumstances that the statements inferred that 
the Plaintiff had espoused opposition to municipal power to get 
elected and then immediately pursued a pro-municipal power agenda 
as Mayor, and 
" [t]o suggest that those who trusted such a man and voted 
for him because of his announced intentions would not, 
following his change of heart, have at least contempt for 
him borders on the ridiculous." (R. 353-54) 
The implied factual assertion that West opposed municipal power 
to get elected and then immediately pursued a pro-municipal power 
agenda as mayor is capable of being proven true or false, 
therefore, the statements of the defendant Guldan were not 
constitutionally protected expressions of opinion. Milkovich v. 
Lorain Journal Co., 491 U.S. 1, 110 S.Ct 2695 (1990). 
4 
P O I N T II, WHETHER OR NOT THE UTAH COURT OF APPFAT.S 
CONSIDERED THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT THAT THE 
STATEMENTS AT ISSUE WERE CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED EXPRESSIONS 
OF OPINION UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 15 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
IS IMMATERIAL BECAUSE, EVEN IF THEY HAD, IT WOULDN'T HAVE ALTERED 
THE RESULTS OF THE APPEAL, 
Defendants, joined by amicus curiae SPJ, urged the court to 
adopt an opinion privilege under Article I, Section 15 of the 
Utah State Constitution. However, it appeared to the Utah Court 
of Appeals, from a review of the record, that Defendants did not 
raise this state constitutional argument below, and that the 
Court generally will not consider an issue, even a constitutional 
one, which the defendant raises on appeal for the first time. 
Whether or not the Court erred in not addressing the Utah 
State Constitutional argument concerning the statements in issue 
seems immaterial, since the Defendant Guldan had already said, 
that his remarks were made in a singularly unopinionated format 
and all that he had done, was to present the facts which were 
available to him, and left any conclusions to the reader. 
(Defendants brief Appendix "G") 
P O I N T III, EVEN IF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS HAD ACCEPTED 
THE FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE REQUIREMENT THAT A LIBEL PLAINTIFF 
PRODUCE "CLEAR AND CONVINCING" EVIDENCE THAT THE DEFENDANTS ACTED 
WITH ACTUAL MALICE AS LAID DOWN BY THE ANDERSON CASE, IT WOULDN'T 
HAVE ALTERED THE RESULTS OF THE APPEAL, 
The Utah Court of Appeals refused to be the first court in 
the state, to commit the State of Utah, to adopt the federal 
civil procedure requirement that a libel plaintiff on a motion 
for summary judgment produce "clear and convincing" evidence that 
the defendants acted with actual malice. See Anderson v Liberty 
Lobby. Inc.. 477 U.S. 242 (1986). However, the Court made it 
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very clear that if it had accepted Anderson. it would not have 
altered the result of the appeal, because such a standard of 
clear and convincing evidence had been met by the Plaintiffs. 
See West, at 189 n.ll. 
ARGUMENTS 
P O I N T I. THE STATEMENTS AT ISSUE ARE NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY 
PROTECTED EXPRESSIONS OF OPINION UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT. 
A statement is not constitutionally protected expressions of 
opinion if it contain a "provable false factual connotation." 
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 491 U.S. 1, 110 S.Ct 2695 
(1990). 
The trial court found that the following statements, as 
printed in an article written by Defendant Guldan, are 
defamatory: 
" . . . Terry West, when running for mayor, was opposed to 
it. (municipal power). However, the first thing West did as 
mayor was . . . [he] reactivated the municipal power issue. 
(Article dated June 27, 1988, Defendants brief Appendix 
»D") " 
"I said Mayor West had been opposed to municipal power 
during the election. The mayor claims he never took that 
position. Several LaVerkin citizens however have told me 
that prior to the election they were under the impression 
West was opposed to municipal power, which is why they voted 
for him." (Follow-up article dated July 2, 1988, 
Defendants7 brief Appendix "G") 
Defendants-Appellants and the amicus curiae SPJ contend that 
the statements in the two articles relating to the plaintiff's 
change of position on the municipal power issue are not 
actionable, because the statements are not defamatory. In 
essence, they argue that politicians frequently change their 
positions on issues and that accusing a public official of such a 
6 
change, even if false, does not injure the reputation of the 
public official. The trial court said the following in answer to 
this argument: 
"Of course, to determine whether or not the statement 
is defamatory one must consider the statement and its 
meaning in the context in which the statement was made and 
not in a vacuum. This allegation of a change of position 
was made following a hotly contested election in a small 
community where candidates lost or won depending upon their 
announced position regarding municipal power. The voters 
had, prior to the election, expressed their opposition to 
the acquisition of a power distribution system by the City 
of LaVerkin. The voters were therefore likely to elect 
those whose shared the opposition espoused by the majority." 
(R. 353) (emphases added) 
In Judge Eves' Memorandum Opinion dated October 17, 1990, 
relying on the Milkovich case, the court correctly presented the 
issue in question as follows: 
"In this case the question is simply whether the statements 
of the defendants regarding the plaintiff's position on 
municipal power contain a provable false factual connota-
tion." (R 421) (emphasis added) 
The trial court correctly found that the statements complained of 
clearly inferred that the Plaintiff espoused opposition to 
municipal power to get elected and then immediately pursued a 
pro-municipal power agenda as mayor, because as the court said: 
To suggest that those who trusted such a man and voted for 
him because of his announced intentions would not, following 
his change of heart, have at least contempt for him borders 
on the ridiculous." (R. 354) (emphasis added) 
After finding that the statements were defamatory, the court 
found that the connotation that the plaintiff had espoused 
opposition to municipal power to get elected, was impossible to 
prove, and therefore, the connotation was entitled to full 
constitutional protection. The court held, 
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"Specifically, this Court finds that it would be impossible 
for anyone to prove, given the facts before the Court in 
this case, what the precise position . . . the mayor (held) 
on the issue of municipal power prior to the election. The 
only person who would have all of the facts necessary to 
prove that issue would be the Mayor himself. (R 421) 
(emphasis added) 
It is specifically this finding wherein the plaintiff claims the 
trial court erred in analyzing the issues which was before it. 
The issue isn't, and never was, what the, 
"precise position the mayor (held) on the issue of municipal 
power prior to the election." 
The issue is and always has been whether or not the plaintiff, 
publicly espoused opposition to municipal power during the 
election to get elected and then immediately pursued a pro-
municipal power agenda as Mayor of the city. (See Memorandum 
Opinion dated July 25, 1988, Defendants brief Appendix "C" R. 
354) 
The Utah Court of Appeals also recognized that the trial 
court erred on this issue, 
". . .In applying the Milkovich test to the present case, 
we must determine whether the connotation that West opposed 
municipal power in order to be elected was sufficiently 
factual to be susceptible of being proven false. . . . The 
trial court erroneously reasoned that since only West could 
truly know his position before the election, Guldan's report 
of his change in position could not be proven true or false. 
The trial court failed to recognize that it is West's public 
position, not his private view, that is at issue. . . " 
(West, at 186) (emphasis added) 
In the opinion of the trial court, the Milkovich decision 
stands for the proposition that there must be independent 
objective proof that the "factual connotation" is false, before 
the matter may be submitted to a trier of fact, i.d.. objective 
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proof that the Plaintiff did not espouse opposition to municipal 
power during the election to get elected and then immediately 
pursued a pro-municipal power agenda as mayor. (R. 421-422) 
The Plaintiff contents that the "letters to the citizens" 
(R. 349 Appendix 7) are independent objective proof that he did 
not espouse opposition to municipal power prior to the election. 
However, the trial court found different, it said: 
"This Court has reviewed the "letters to citizens" which 
plaintiff [claims] demonstrate his pre-election position. 
These letters appear ambiguous and unenlightening to this 
Court. . . " (R. 365) 
The Utah Court of Appeals said the following concerning 
whether or not the "letters to the citizens" are "objective 
proof" that the Plaintiff did not espouse opposition to municipal 
power prior to the election to get elected: 
. . . The trial court ruled that the letter was insufficient 
to raise a question as to whether West in fact opposed 
municipal power before the election. Such a conclusion was 
incorrect. The letter clearly indicates that West was 
taking a pro-municipal power position before the election. 
The letter therefore creates a material question of fact as 
to West's pre-election position. 
We conclude that the trial court erred in ruling that 
the connotations of Guldan's comments were not factual 
enough to be susceptible of being proven as true or false. 
Either West did, or he did not, publicly oppose municipal 
power prior to the election. If he did not oppose municipal 
power, then it cannot truthfully be said that he opposed it 
for political gain. If a jury finds that West publicly 
opposed municipal power prior to the election, West will 
have failed to prove that the statements were in fact false 
and his libel claim will fail. If, on the other hand, a 
jury concludes that West publicly and consistently supported 
municipal power prior to the election, then any connotation 
in Guldan's articles that he opposed municipal power in 
order to get elected would, as a matter of logic, be proven 
false." West v. Thomson Newspaper, 835 P.2d 179 at 186. 
(emphases added) 
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Since the Court of Appeal found that it is possible for the 
factual connotation of Guldan's articles to be proven false, i.e. 
that the Plaintiff espoused opposition to municipal power during 
the election to get elected and then immediately pursued a pro-
municipal power agenda. The Utah Court of Appeals held that 
Guldan's statements in his articles concerning West's change of 
position are actionable." id. 
P O I N T II, WHETHER OR NOT THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CONSIDERED THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT THAT THE 
STATEMENTS AT ISSUE WERE CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED EXPRESSIONS 
OF OPINION UNDER ARTICLE I. SECTION 15 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
IS IMMATERIAL BECAUSE EVEN IF THEY HAD. IT WOULDN'T HAVE ALTERED 
THE RESULTS OF THE APPEAL. 
The Utah Court of Appeals did not take into consideration 
the Defendants-Appellants7 Second Affirmative Defense to 
plaintiff's complaint, because it appeared to the Court from 
review of the record, that Defendants-Appellants did not raise 
this state constitutional argument below, West, at 184 n.5. and 
because of Guldan's portrayal in his second article that the 
statements in his first article were "facts which were available 
to him" and that he "left any conclusions to the reader." (id. 
at 186 n.7.) 
If the Utah Constitutional argument was made before the 
trial court as the Defendants-Appellants claim in their brief, 
the constitutional argument must have been made in a passing 
remark since the trial court had three chances to refer to such 
an argument in it's three Memorandum Opinions which were appealed 
to the Utah Court of Appeals. In reviewing the three Memorandum 
Opinions made by the trial court there is no mention of a Utah 
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State constitutional argument in any of them. (See Defendants' 
brief Appendix "C") 
The only time the Defendants-Appellants made the Utah 
constitutional argument was after the Milkovich case came down, 
and their argument was based on Immuno A.G. v. Moor-Jankowski. 18 
Med. L. Rptr. 1625, a New York 1991 case which discussed 
Milkovich in relation to the New York State Constitution. Both 
cases came after June 7, 1990, when Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
was argued. In Defendant's brief to the Utah Court of Appeals, 
the Utah constitution argument comprised a large part of their 
brief, however, this was the first brief or memorandum in which 
this argument was made. 
If the Supreme Court of Utah ever did want to address the 
issue of what protection, if &ny, is independently afforded to 
expressions of opinion under Utah's constitution, the Court would 
not pick the West case to make this determination for the 
following two reasons: 
1. If there was any doubt or confusion with the readers of 
Guldan's June 27, 1988, article, as to whether or not the 
statements made in that article were opinion or fact, the 
reporter-defendant Rick Guldan, took any doubt or confusion away 
when he made the following statement in his July 2, 1988, follow-
up article. 
In my last column, I addressed, areas of concern I had 
about the Mayor's actions. I believe I addressed them in a 
singularly unopinionated format. All I have done is 
presented the facts which were available to me, and left any 
conclusions to the reader. (See Defendants brief Appendix 
"G") 
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The Utah Court of Appeals recognized this fact when it said 
the following: 
"The trial court ruled that Guldan's comments were his 
"interpretation" of the pre-election position of the Mayor 
and were therefore "opinion." Such a conclusion is directly 
contrary to Guldan's own portrayal in his second article of 
his earlier statements. West at 186 n.7. 
For a Court to conclude under these circumstances that the 
statements complained of were protected as "opinion" under the 
Utah constitution, such a conclusion would be directly contrary 
to Guldan's own portrayal of his earlier statements. 
2. If a plaintiff in a defamation suit proves the 
"falsity" of a challenged statement and can "affirmatively 
produce evidence" upon which a reasonable jury could find by 
Mclear and convincing" evidence that a media defendant acted with 
"actual malice," the Utah Supreme Court should not find that the 
Utah State Constitution protects such challenged speech made by a 
reporter knowing that it was false or with reckless disregard 
whether if was true or false. Even the State of Utah's common 
law rule of "fair comment11 requires the absence of "actual 
malice." Also the State of Utah's retracjtion statute, 45-2-1 
U.C.A., which protected newspapers from punitive damages, 
requires that the challenged statements were made in "good 
faith." Why would any State, let alone the State of Utah, want 
to protect a defamatory statement made with "actual malice," i.e. 
knowing it was false or with reckless disregard whether it was 
true or false, from an action in defamation because it was 
"couched" in an arguably opinion formate and particularly when 
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such defamatory statement contains a "provable false factual 
connotation?" 
Therefore, for the reasons set forth herein, the Utah Court 
of Appeals was correct in refusing to consider the issue of 
whether the Utah constitution affords greater protection to the 
press in the area of protected opinion than does the federal 
constitution. 
P O I N T III. EVEN IF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS HAD ACCEPTED 
THE FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE REQUIREMENT THAT A LIBEL PLAINTIFF 
PRODUCE "CLEAR AND CONVINCING" EVIDENCE THAT THE DEFENDANTS ACTED 
WITH ACTUAL MALICE AS LAID DOWN BY THE ANDERSON CASE. IT WOULDN'T 
HAVE ALTERED THE RESULTS OF THE APPEAL. 
The court in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, supra held that 
there is no genuine issue if the evidence brought forward in the 
opposing affidavits is "of insufficient caliber or quantity to 
allow a rational finder of fact to find actual malice by clear 
and convincing evidence." Id. at 2513. The Anderson court said 
that its holding was not meant to denigrate the role of the jury, 
or authorize trial on affidavits. Id. 
The evidence of the non-movement is to be believed, and all 
justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor, and the 
moving party must foreclose [] the possibility of the existence 
of certain facts from which the jury could infer actual malice, 
and credibility determination, the weighing of evidence, and the 
drawing of legitimate inferences remain the functions of the 
jury, not the judge on a summary judgment motion. Id. at 2510 
and 2513 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 
(1970)). The Court further seemed to admonish the trial judges 
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to err on the side of denying summary judgment "where there is 
reason to believe that the better course would be to proceed to a 
full trial." Anderson at 106 S.Ct. at .2514 (citing Kennedy v. 
Silas Mason Co.. 334 U.S. 249 (1948)). 
The court in West, at 189 n.ll, declined to follow the 
Anderson case as a matter of civil procedure. Whether or not the 
Supreme Court of Utah wants to adopt the federal civil procedure 
requirement that a libel plaintiff produce "clear and convincing" 
evidence that the defendants acted with actual malice as set 
forth in the Anderson case, does not matter in the instant case 
because there was sufficient "clear and convincing" evidence 
before the Utah Court of Appeals to find a jury issue as to 
actual malice. 
The Utah Court of Appeals also thought that there was 
sufficient clear and convincing evidence from which a jury might 
return a verdict in the plaintiff's favor. The Court said the 
following concerning this subject on page 189 n.ll of the West 
case: 
"Even if we were to adopt the federal approach set forth in 
Anderson, it would not alter the result of this appeal. As 
the Supreme Court itself said, "[t]he evidence of the non-
movement is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences 
are to be drown in his favor,." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 
106 S.Ct. at 2513, and "the plaintiff to survive the 
defendant's motion, need only present evidence from which a 
jury might return a verdict in his favor. If he does so, 
there is a genuine issue of fact that requires a trial." 
Id. at 257, 106 S.Ct. at 2514 (emphasis added). Such a 
standard has been met here." 
The Defendants-Appellants said the following on page 29 of 
their brief: 
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. • . "Rather, the majority held that Hogun and Goodey were 
not entitled to summary judgment because the Mayor came 
forward with sufficient evidence to demonstrate the 
"possibility" that a jury could find that they acted with 
actual malice. Id. at 188-89. This view denigrates the 
proper role of the trial court in an actual malice case and 
is both constitutionally and procedurally infirm." 
(emphasis added by plaintiff) 
The Defendants should read the Anderson case more carefully. The 
Utah Court of Appeals made it clear that it was following the 
Anderson case when it was using the words "foreclose" and 
"possibility." The Court of Appeals said, 
Hogun's assertion that the foregoing facts demand 
summary judgment is erroneous. While they might be 
persuasive to a jury, they do not support a motion for 
summary judgment because they do not foreclose the 
possibility that a jury might find actual malice. See 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 
2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (citing Adickes v. S.H. 
Kress & Co.. 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (moving party must 
"foreclose [] the possibility of the existence of certain 
facts " from which the jury could infer a conspiracy) . 
West, at 188. (emphases in original) 
Viewing the accumulation of circumstantial evidence and 
the possible inferences in favor of West, we conclude that 
Hogun and Goodey were not entitled to summary judgment as a 
matter of law. Hogun and Goodey did not foreclose the 
possibility of a jury finding that they acted with actual 
malice. They presented evidence which could support a 
jury's finding in their favor, but the evidence does not 
mandate such a finding. . . . West at 189. (emphases 
added) 
The attorney for Defendants-Appellants wanted the Utah Court 
of Appeals to adopt the holding in the Anderson case that "clear 
and convincing" evidence is needed for a public figure to prevail 
at a summary judgment hearing in a libel suit, without also 
accepting that the Anderson case stands for the proposition that 
"the plaintiff, to survive the defendant's motion, need only 
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present evidence from which a jury might return a verdict in his 
favor. If he does so, there is a genuine issue of fact that 
requires a trial." Id. 477 U.S. at.257, 106 S.Ct. at 2514 
(emphasis in original). The Utah Court of Appeals in discussing 
the West case in relationship with the Anderson holding said, 
"such a standard has been met here." See West, at 189 n.ll. 
The Defendants do not want to accept the Court of Appeals 
finding that their evidence presented at the motion for summary 
judgment did not "foreclose" the "possibility" of a jury finding 
that they acted with actual malice. See Anderson at 477 U.S. at 
249, 106 S.Ct. at 1510; see West, at 188. 
At the trial court's hearing on defendants7 Motion to 
.Dismiss, the Plaintiff-Appellee did marshall sufficient evidence 
on "actual malice" on the part of Hogun and Goodey to meet the 
"clear and convincing" standard of fault to have allowed the 
issue of "actual malice" to go to the jury. 
The -record will show that neither Hogun or Goodey made any 
inquiries or verification about the statements complained of, or 
have someone else verify any information, prior to publication of 
the July 2, 1988, follow-up article (Hogun Affidavit R. 325 #14 
and Goodey Affidavit 33 3 #18) even after they were given 
information that would have given them serious doubts as to the 
correctness of their June 27, 1988, article. (Terry West 
Affidavit R 349 exhibit 1) (R 349 exhibit 6, reply letter to the 
June 27, 1988 article) After the June article was published 
their attorney advised them that they need not make any 
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corrections or retractions other than the correction and 
retraction concerning the insurance issue, stating that it was 
his opinion that the additional statements complained of were the 
defendant Guldan's opinions to which a further retraction or 
clarification was not necessary nor appropriate, (R 325, 333) In 
their discussion with their attorney, the defendants' affidavits 
show that the issue as to whether or not the statements 
complained of were true or false was ignored by both the attorney 
and defendants. (see defendant's affidavits R 322-335) The 
inference is that the Defendants were more worried about whether 
the statements were actionable, than whether or not the 
statements were true or false. 
Hogun allowed a follow-up article to be printed on July 2, 
1988, however, he claims he did not review the article, (R.282-
83) the inference is that he did not do so in an effort to 
protect himself from suit. 
The July article was written in the face of red flags 
flying. To say that the defendants did not entertain "serious 
doubts" with red flags flying, at the time the follow-up article 
was printed, would take us into "make believe land." The focus 
of the actual malice inquiry is on the defendant's attitude 
toward the truth or falsity of the publication, on his subjective 
awareness of its probable falsity, and on his actual doubts as to 
its accuracy, (not on what their attorney advised them or whether 
the statements were actionable) Lawrence v. Bauer Publishing, 89 
N.J. 451, 467-68 (1982) See also Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 
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F.2d 206, 209 (7th Cir. 1976) (actual malice concentrates on the 
defendants' attitude toward the truth or falsity of the material 
published) (not on what their attorney advised them or whether or 
not the statements were actionable) 
In Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, 692 F.2d 
189, 196 (1st Cir. 1982) aff'd 104 S.Ct. 1949, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 
(1984) the court said, 
The subjective determination of whether a (defendant) in 
fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the 
statement may be proved by inference, as it would be rare 
for a defendant to admit such doubts . . . . A court 
typically will infer actual malice from objective facts . . 
These facts should provide evidence of negligence, 
motive, and intent such that an accumulation of the evidence 
and appropriate inferences supports the existence of actual 
malice. (emphasis added) 
The accumulation of objective facts that will support the 
finding of actual malice in the case at hand are found in POINT 
III #1 thru #8 below. However you will find each of the 
following categories of evidence standing alone is sufficient 
evidence to support "actual malice". 
1. Appearance of new reasons to doubt coupled with no new 
investigation as evidence of actual malice. See POINT 
III (2) below. 
2. Reliability of sources. See POINT III (3) below. 
The Defendants-Appellants must remember what the court said 
in Tavoulareas v. Piro, 759 F.2d 90, 116 (1985), wherein it said, 
The issue is not whether the memorandum alone proves clearly 
and convincingly that the article was published with actual 
malice, it is whether it is evidence that, taken in conjunc-
tion with other evidence, tends to prove that fact clearly 
and convincingly. 
Therefore, the issue in the present case is not whether each 
18 
of the evidences listed in POINT III of this brief will alone 
prove clearly and convincingly that the defendants published with 
actual malice, it is whether each is evidence that, taken in 
conjunction with other evidence, tends to prove clearly and 
convincingly that the defendants acted with actual malice. 
The plaintiff here will attempt to demonstrate by 
circumstantial evidence and justifiable inferences that the 
Defendants-Appellants Hogun and Goodey acted with actual malice. 
Each of the major categories of evidence of "actual malice" 
will be discussed in turn, though their order of appearance is 
not meant to reflect their relative importance. 
1. SUPPRESSION OF INFORMATION 
FAVORABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF 
AS EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL MALICE 
JULY 2. 1988 ARTICLE 
Each defendant had strong, if not conclusive evidence in 
their possession that the connotation that the plaintiff had 
opposed municipal power during the election to get elected, and 
immediately changed his position after the election was false. 
(Letters to Citizens R. 349 exhibit 7) All three Defendants 
deliberately suppressed these letters during the writing and 
editing of the follow-up story in order to strengthen their case 
against the plaintiff. The inference is that their failure to 
cause plaintiff's pre-election letter to the citizens to be 
mentioned in the follow-up article was a deliberate attempt to 
avoid any indication that the initial article was erroneous. 
The Court in Tavoulareas v. Piro supra, said at 125, 
"Unquestionably, a writer (or editor) of an article who 
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knowingly suppresses the facts that would prove its falsity 
is more likely to have doubts about the accuracy of his 
defamatory story than one who either has no such knowledge 
or has endeavored to present the facts fairly. The writer 
who suppresses favorable facts is more likely to suspect 
that his version is not substantially true. Hence courts 
have held repeatedly that the choices of which facts to 
report is relevant to the question of actual malice. . . . 
The editorial process by which the defendants selected which 
facts they would print, and which they would suppress, was a 
factor the jury could take into account in reaching its 
conclusion as to actual malice." 
Tavoulareas v. Piro, 759 F2d 90, (D.C. Cir. 1985, three-judge 
panel) was vacated by en bano order of the full court in 
Tavoulareas v. Piro. 817 F.2d 762 (D.C. 1987), however, this 
category of "actual malice" was not rejected in the latter case. 
EVIDENCE OF 
ACTUAL MALICE 
The defendant Don Hogun was given the letters to the 
citizens (Letters to Citizens XR 349 exhibit 7) by the plaintiff-
appellant prior to the publishing of the July 2, 1988, follow-up 
article, and he read them in the presence of the plaintiff-
respondent, (dep. Hogun 40 21 to 42 3) (Terry West affidavit R 
349 exhibit 1 #5) yet he did not make sure that the letters were 
used in the follow-up article of July 2, 1988, even though he 
promised he would give them to the defendants Rick Guldan and 
Brent Goodey for verification, (id. at #5) He also testified 
that he had no reason to think that the letters were not sent to 
all the citizens. (Dep. Hogun 45 9-11) 
The Defendant Hogun testified that.he gave the "letters to 
the citizens" to the defendant Brent Goodey. (dep. Hogun 62 5-
12) Therefore, when the defendant Brent Goodey edited the 
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follow-up article of July 2, 1988, he knew that this evidence 
would have discredited the paper's position if he had included 
the "letters to the citizens" in the follow-up article. 
2. APPEARANCE OF NEW REASONS TO DOUBT 
COUPLED WITH NO NEW INVESTIGATION 
AS EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL MALICE 
THE FOLLOW-UP ARTICLE 
OF JULY 2, 1988 
We must look at the follow-up article of July 2, 1988, 
different since by the time this article was written, there had 
been obvious reasons interposed which would have given "serious 
doubts" to all three defendants as to the accuracy of the 
information that appeared in the June 27, 1988, article; yet none 
of the defendants made any effort to verify plaintiff's alleged 
inaccuracies of the June 27, 1988, article, other than the 
insurance claim in the article. (R. 325 #14, R. 333 #18) This 
allowed several of the same inaccuracies to reappear in the 
follow-up article of July 2, 1988, with no further new investiga-
tion or collaboration. Under these circumstances Rodney A. 
Smolla in his publication LAW OF DEFAMATION, sec 3.23(3) said the 
following: 
When in such a republication or follow-up story no new 
investigation is undertaken, despite the appearance of new 
reasons for doubt, actual malice may exist with regard to 
the sequel even if the first story was protected, (citations 
omitted) 
See also Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, where the court held 
that the defendants had actual malice and pointed out that, 
"little investigative effort was expended initially, and no 
additional inquires were made even after the editors were 
notified by respondent and his daughter that the account, to 
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be published was absolutely untrue." 388 U.S. at 169-70, 87 
S.Ct. at 1999, 18 L.Ed.2d at 1119. 
EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL MALICE 
DEFENDANT DON HOGUN 
To hold the defendant-respondent Don Hogun liable for the 
defamatory inaccuracies in the follow-up article of July 2, 1988, 
the plaintiff must show that the defendant had "actual malice," 
that he participated in the circumstances that led up to the 
publication of the article, and that his participation was 
significant enough, and was rendered with sufficient knowledge, 
to make him liable for the reporter's statements. 
Defendant Hogun is the Publisher and General Manager of The 
Daily Spectrum, and among his responsibilities is the overseeing 
of the operations of the newspaper, and is responsible for what 
goes on in the newspaper, and ultimately has the authority as to 
what news articles might appear or be withheld from publication, 
(dep. Hogun 5 3-13 17 20-24) 
The only defendant that the plaintiff communicated with 
concerning the inaccuracies in the article of June 27, 1988, was 
the defendant Don Hogun. (R 349 exhibit 1 paragraph 1) 
While the defendant, Don Hogun, may be protected from 
finding actual malice in the article of June 27, 1988, by his 
reliance on the defendant Rick Guldan and Brent Goodey for 
investigation, verification, and reviewing, and because he had 
not read the article prior to its publication and had no reason 
to doubt the accuracy of its contents, it is different as to the 
follow-up article of July 2, 1988. He cannot avoid liability 
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merely by pointing to the responsibilities assigned in the 
newspapers organizational chart. (dep. Hogun 69 24 "That 
responsibility, again, rests with Brent Goodey") He is not 
protected from liability for the printing the July 2, 1988, 
article, because of his participation and involvement in the 
circumstances that lead to its publication. 
The defendant, Don Hogun, would be hard put not to have had 
"serious doubts" about the accuracies of the June 27, and July 2, 
1988, articles, after specific information of inaccuracies and 
requests for an apology, correction, or retraction were given to 
him personally by the plaintiff prior to the publication of the 
follow-up article of July 2, 1988, (Terry West affidavit R 349 
exhibit 1 #5), yet he made no effort to verify, correct, or kill 
the story prior to publication, (Don Hogun Affidavit R 325 #14) 
notwithstanding the fact he possessed information that would have 
certainly given him "serious doubts" as to the accuracy of the 
information that was again republished. Just the fact that the 
paper found out, that the inference that the mayor had committed 
insurance fraud, and the inference that the mayor was using his 
office for the profit of a "friend" were false, (dep. Hogun 54 
14-16) (article dated July 2, 1988 R. 349 exhibit 8), would have 
alerted the defendants to other possible inaccuracies connected 
to plaintiff's specific denials, and would have alerted them, to 
the need for new re-examination or verification of the alleged 
inaccuracies, prior to republishing the same errors. With these 
"red flags flying" a jury could easily find that Hogun's inaction 
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inferred a reckless state of mind. 
The following is a list of information given Hogun prior to 
the publication of the follow-up article of July, 2, 1988, which 
would have given the defendant reason to doubt the accuracies of 
the statements in the June 27 article. 
1. The plaintiff read his complaint letter (R 349 exhibit 
6) with Don Hogun and at the same time made verbal denials 
and explanations to him regarding the inaccuracies in the 
June 27, 1988, article. (R 349 exhibit 1 at #5) 
2. The plaintiff told the defendant Don Hogun that he 
could verify with the city manager or the city council 
members as to his (Terry West's) denial of trying to push 
through a conditional use permit after a regular council 
meeting that would have allowed a beer licence to be issued 
for a friend, fid, at #5) 
3. The plaintiff told the defendant Don Hogun that as 
Mayor, he had the City of LaVerkin send out the three 
letters to all the citizens of LaVerkin, setting out the 
position of all the council members, including the Mayor, on 
the issue of municipal power, on October 27, 1987, seven 
days before the November election. He told the defendant 
that the purpose of the letters were to let the voters know 
what the position of all members of the city council were, 
including the mayor, on the municipal power issue, and Don 
Hogun said he would give these letters to Rick Guldan and 
Brent Goodey and have them verify them and what I had told 
him. (id. at #5) 
The defendant, Don Hogun, told the plaintiff that he 
would give the "reply letter" and the "letter to the citizens" to 
the defendants Rick Guldan and Brent Goodey, and that he would 
have them verify them and the things which the Plaintiff told 
him. (id. at #5) 
Notwithstanding the promise from Hogun that he would have 
Rick Guldan and Brent Goodey verify the "reply letter" (R 349 
exhibit 6) and the "letters to the citizens" (R 349 exhibit 7) 
and the things that the Plaintiff had told him, the defendant, 
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Don Hogun, failed to keep his promises, (see citation below) 
With all the specific denials, showing the inaccuracies in 
the June 27, 1988, article, with "red flags flying", Hogun still 
allowed another article to be published without giving direction 
as to how to handle any examination or re-examination of the 
alleged inaccuracies of the June 27, 1988, article, (Don Hogun R 
325 at #14) (see citations below) after assuring the plaintiff 
that, "I'll take care of it." (Terry West affidavit R 349 
Exhibit 1 at #1) 
The court in St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 20 L.Ed.2d 
262,, 88 S.Ct 1323, said the following in regards to Hogun 
publishing with "serious doubts" as to the truth of his 
publication: 
(T)here must be sufficient evidence to permit the 
conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious 
doubts as to the truth of his publication; and that publish-
ing with such doubts shows reckless disregard for truth or 
falsity and demonstrates actual malice. 
The following is evidence of lack of action on Hogun's part 
and his failure to give direction of any kind and particularly 
direction for new investigations into the truth of the statements 
complained of after he had been given reasons to doubt the 
accuracy of the June 27, article and prior to the publication of 
the July 2, article, which under the circumstances is evidence 
that shows reckless disregard for truth: 
Q. Did you examine or re-examine the — did you 
examine or re-examine Exhibit 5 (June 27, 
1988, article), in light of the demand for an 
apology? Did you examine the factual 
situations in your Exhibit 5, after receiving 
my denial of most of your accusations? 
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A. No. I didn't. 
Q. Did you ask anybody to examine or re-examine 
the factual statements in Exhibit 5? 
A. No. 
(dep. Hogun 39 14-22) 
Q. Did you, or anyone by your direction, 
investigate to see if the letter, marked 
Exhibit 7, claimed by Mr. West to be sent to 
all LaVerkin citizens, encouraging them to 
vote for municipal power, was in fact sent? 
A. No. 
Q. You didn't ask anybody to investigate that? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you, after receiving Exhibit 6 & 7, or 
someone else at your direction, re-examine 
the original source for your information that 
the plaintiff had changed his position 
immediately after election? 
A. No. 
(dep. Hogun 46 21 to 47 23) 
Q. Well, did you attempt any investigation to 
verify the truth or falsity of what Mr. West 
said in his letter to the editor? 
A. No. 
(dep. Hogun 55 1-4) 
Q. Did you give any instructions to Mr. Goodey 
concerning Exhibit 8 (July 2, article), in 
light of the fact that you knew that there 
was a threat of a lawsuit? 
A. No. 
(dep. Hogun 66 23 to 67 10) 
The following is evidence of lack of concern about truth by 
Hogun after he had been given reasons to doubt the accuracy of 
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the June 27, articles and prior to the publication of the July 2, 
article, which under the circumstances is evidence that tends to 
show reckless disregard for truth: 
Q. Were you disturbed, in June and July (1988), 
when the articles, Exhibit 5 (June 27 
article)and 8 (July 2, article), were being 
printed about the plaintiff, by the fact or 
the possibility that such bad publicity may 
hurt Mayor West's credibility if not ac-
curate? 
MR. Dryer: Objection. Argumentative, compound. You can answer 
the question. 
Q. The question was, though, did it ever enter 
your mind that if the statements were 
inaccurate, did it ever disturb you, that it 
might hurt my credibility? 
Mr. Dryer: First of all, did you ever believe that at the time 
of publication, that anything contained in Exhibits 6 & 8 were 
inaccurate, excuse me, 5 and 8? 
A. No. I had no reason to believe they were 
inaccurate. 
Q. Okay. But I said before and after, and that 
includes the time when you got a rebuttal 
letter to the editor which pointed out the 
inaccuracies. And my question is, weren't 
you disturbed of the possibility that they 
were inaccurate and they would hurt my 
credibility? 
A. No. 
(dep. Hogun 9 21 to 10 22) 
Q. Okay, what he's asking you is, given the fact 
that the mayor (had) brought in a letter to 
you and the fact that he had threatened to 
sue you, did that cause you enough concern 
that you wanted to know what Rick Guldan was 
going to include in his July 2nd, '88 column? 
A. That responsibility, again, rests with Brent 
Goodey. 
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Q. Okay, I asked you, did you have any concern? 
A. Not enough to contact Rick. 
(dep. Hogun 69 16 to 70 9) 
Q. Did it concern you when you read Mr. Guldan's 
July 2nd, 1988 letter that he made no 
reference to this letter that Mayor West 
supposedly sent to the residents of the City 
of LaVerkin? 
A. No, it did not. 
Q. Didn't you fell compelled to be totally 
accurate, with the information you had in 
your possession, to avoid injuring Mr. West? 
A. No. 
(dep. Hogun 72 11-22) 
ACTUAL MALICE 
DEFENDANT BRENT GOODEY 
The defendant Brent Goody admitted, that after receiving the 
plaintiff's letter to the editor, which contained specific 
denials of the inaccuracies complained of, that the "letter" made 
him aware that there was a difference of opinions as to the 
alleged inaccuracies. (dep. Goodey 80 20 to 81 5) 
The issue is, after the defendant Brent Goodey had read the 
plaintiff's reply letter (R 349 exhibit 6)(dep. Goodey 72 15-
17) , and after he had been given the letter to the citizens (R 
349 exhibit #7)(dep. Hogun 62 5-12), all of which gave the 
defendant reasons to have "serious doubts" as to the truth of the 
alleged inaccuracies in the June 27, DID the defendant Goodey 
follow his own stated polices and order further inquiry and 




. . . (I)f I have reason to believe that something 
might be incorrect, . . . then there would be an 
attempt for more investigation . . . " (dep. Goodey 31 
5-19) and, 
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 We will continue to investigate, but will only print 
what can be verified. That way, when the whole mess is 
sorted out, only the guilty will be 'hung'— if there 
are any guilty." (dep. Goodey 26 10 to 27.8) 
In defendant Goodey's Affidavit, he said: 
"In reliance of the advise of Mr. Anderson, I published 
plaintiff's letter to the editor and accompanying editor's 
note and undertook no further action or investigation with 
regard to the matter." (R 333-34 #18) 
Rick Guldan testified in his answers to interrogatories on 
this subject as follow, 
Question 31. Did you have any discussion with 
Brent Goodey about the plaintiff's reply letter, to 
your article of June 27, 1988, before publication of 
your article of July 2, 1988, the one complained of in 
plaintiff's second cause of action? 
Answer. Yes. 
Question 31 (a). Did he ask you to re-examine the 
information that you used for your article of June 27, 
1988, and make further investigations as to the 
plaintiff's allegations that there were factual 
inaccuracies in your article or any other statement to 
that affect? 
Answer. No. 
Question 31 (b) . Did he ask you to check to see 
if the letter or letters that the plaintiff alleged 
were sent to the citizens of LaVerkin prior to the 
election were in fact sent? 
Answer. No. 
Question 31 (c) . Did he ask you to make correc-




Question 31 (d). Did he give you any instructions 
or advice or set a policy for this particular situation 
as to how to proceed as to the plaintiff's complaints 
that many of the statements in your article were not 
true and the plaintiff's demand for an apology? 
Answer. No. 
Question 31 (f) . Were there any discussions 
concerning the statements the plaintiff complained of? 
Answer. No. 
Question 31. (g) Who approved your article of 
June 27, 1988, for publication? 
Answer. Brent Goodey. 
(R 349 pages 52 to 53) 
When in a follow-up story no new investigation is 
undertaken, despite the appearance of new reasons for doubt, 
actual malice may exist with regard to the follow-up story even 
though actual malice could not be found in the first story. 
Rodney A. Smolla, LAW OF DEFAMATION, sec. 3.23(3) page 3-65 
(citing the following cases) 
See Rinaldi v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 438 N.Y.S.2d 496 (1981); 
Holder v. WLCY-TV, Inc.. 366 So.2d 445 (Fla. Dist. Ct.App. 1978); 
Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal Rptr. 29, cert 
denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979); Good Government Group of Seal Beach, 
inc. v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 672, 150 Cal. Rptr. 258, 586 
P.2d 572 (1978), cert denied sub nom. Good Government Group, Inc, 
v. Hogard, 441 U.S. 961 (1979); Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, 
Inc. , 188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450, cert, denied, 423 U.S. 1025 
(1975; Cochran v. Indianapolis Newspaper, Inc., 175 Ind. App. 48, 
372 N.E.2d 1211 (1978; Restatement (second) of Torts, Sec. 580A, 
comment d at 219 (1977). 
3. RELIABILITY OF SOURCES 
AS EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL MALICE 
The court in Holter v. WLCY T.V. Inc., 366 So.2d 445, 445 
said the following: 
The lesson in Gouldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 
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1969), Snowden v. Pearl River Broadcasting Corp,. 251 So.2d 
405 (La. App.) cert, denied 259 La. 877, 253 So. 2d 217 
(1971, and Mahnke v. Northwest Publications. Inc., 280 Minn. 
328, 160 N.W.2d 1 (1968) is that anonymous or otherwise 
suspect sources should be verified with care. Otherwise, as 
noted in St. Amant. supra, recklessness may be found. 
EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL MALICE 
On or about March 24, 1988, the plaintiff met with the 
defendant Hogun in his office, to give him a reply letter 
entitled "Irresponsible Reporting", a reply letter to The Daily 
Spectrum's article of March 23, 1988, entitled "LaVerkin Resi-
dents Want Protection". At this time, the plaintiff told the 
defendant Don Hogun, that Phil Phillips, together with others in 
LaVerkin, were out to discredit his honesty and integrity. At 
this same time the plaintiff discussed with the defendant Hogun 
the veracity of Phil Phillips and that Rick Guldan was using Phil 
Phillips as his source of information. (Terry West affidavit R 
349 exhibit 1 as #1) The defendant Don Hogun acknowledged this 
conversation during his deposition, and acknowledged that he may 
have told the plaintiff's complaints to Brent Goodey. (dep. 
Hogun 20 20-25, 31 15 to 32 8) 
The Defendant Goodey wrote the following about Phil Phillips 
in an article dated November 20, 1988, entitled How I Came To 
"Love" LaVerkin's mayor: (see R 349 exhibit 9) 
Mr. Phillips, on several occasions, has called various 
people here at the Spectrum to reveal some "hot" tip about 
alleged improprieties by Mayor West. He has, no doubt, been 
frequently disappointed when we have not attempted to "nail" 
the mayor based on unsubstantiated statements or items taken 
out of context. 
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Mr. Phillips, we have attempted to verify, each of your 
"hot" tips about Mr. West, but many turn out to be mountains 
made from molehills, so we ignore them and you think we 
coddle your political enemy. (emphasis added) 
Since these statements were printed five months after the June 
and July articles by Defendant Guldan were printed, they are 
probative that Goodey entertained serious doubts about the 
veracity of Phil Phillips only if it can be shown by inference, 
that Goodey obtained that knowledge prior to the dates of the 
articles in question. 
Mr. Phillips claims that whenever he called the Spectrum to 
give them information about Terry West he asked to talk to the 
Defendant Rick Guldan. (Phil Phillips Affidavit R 349 Appendix 
2 at #6) And the defendant Rick Guldan claims that he had no 
conversation with Phil Phillips about the plaintiff after June 
22, 1988. (Rick Guldan Affidavit R 181 at #10) Therefore, 
according to defendant Rick Guldan, the "hot11 tips and the 
"unsubstantiated statements or items taken out of context" had to 
have occurred prior to June 22, 1988. 
In Goodey,s article as quoted above he said, "Mr. Phillips, 
we have attempted to verify, each of your "hot" tips about Mr. 
West." (emphases added) The inference is, the fact that Phil 
Phillips was an unreliable informant, was known by at least the 
defendants Guldan and Goodey prior to the June 27, 1988, article. 
Finally, it was common knowledge that Phil Phillips had a 
running feud with the plaintiff. 
It is not a closely guarded secret that the two (Terry West 
& Phil Phillips) disagree frequently. . . . and you (Phil 
Phillips) think we coddle your political enemy. (R.349 
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Appendix 9) 
The Defendants relied on Phil Phillips, a known political 
enemy, an informant that Goodey and Guldan had already found to 
be unreliable, an informant that the plaintiff had warned Hogun 
about, and under these circumstances recklessness may be found. 
Likewise, recklessness may be found where there are 
obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or 
the accuracy of his reports. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 
U.S. at 732, 88 S.Ct. at 1326, 20 L.Ed.2d at 267-8. 
The defendants lent credence to Phil Phillips' charges at a 
time when they entertained doubts as to the validity of the 
statements in questions and with doubts as to the reliability of 
the informant, and yet they still published, and it's the 
publication with such doubts which shows reckless disregard for 
truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice. 
The defendant cannot be held accountable unless he "in 
fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his 
publication; and that publishing with such doubts shows 
reckless disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates 
actual malice." St Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731, 88 
S.Ct. 1323, 1325, 20 L.Ed.2d 262 (1968). 
The Defendants-Appellants said the following on page 42 of 
their brief: 
Editor Goodey#s Knowledge That One Of Several Of 
Guldan's Sources Was Biased Against the Mayor Does Not 
Constitute Evidence Of Actual Malice. 
Defendant Guldan was asked the following question in a set 
of Interrogatories: 
14. Before publication of the article complained (of) in 
plaintiffs first cause of action Dated June 27, 1988, 
what inquiry or investigation did you make concerning 
the statement that "Terry West, when running for mayor, 
was opposed to it (municipal power)?" 
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(a) Who did you speak to about said statement? 
(b) What information did you receive from each of said 
persons? 
In the defendant Guldan's Answer: (a) and (b) he stated 
that "Phil Phillips, Carl Davis, Kim Seegmiller, Larry 
Seegmiller, and others the exact names of whom I cannot presently 
recall" told him, "That plaintiff had told them prior to the 
election that plaintiff was opposed to municipal power." (R. 339) 
However, the record shows that only Phil Phillips admits making 
this statement. Carl Davis, (Affidavit R. 349 Appendix 12) Kim 
Seegmiller, (Affidavit R. 349 Appendix 3) and Larry Seegmiller 
(Affidavit R. 349 Appendix 11) all denied making such a 
statement. This leaves only Phil Phillips as the named source 
for Guldan's statement that "Terry West, when running for mayor, 
was opposed to it." (municipal power) And as explained above, 
defendants lent credence to Phil Phillip's charges at a time when 
they entertained serious doubts as to the validity of those 
charges and serious doubts as to the reliability of the 
informant. 
4. DEFENDANTS MOTIVATION 
AS EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL MALICE 
Libel. Slander, and Related Problems, by R. Sack, at 214 
(1980), said that: 
Although common law actual malice—spite or ill will— 
is not equivalent to or sufficient to prove constitu-
tional "actual malice", evidence as to the former is 
admissible to prove the latter. 
The defendant Brent Goodey wrote an article entitled, "HOW I 
COME TO "LOVE" LaVERKIN#S MAYOR", on November 20, 1988. (R 349 
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exhibit 9) After reading the article the inference is that the 
defendant didn't come to "love" the plaintiff but rather came to 
"hate" him. 
Such a mindset, which the jury could reasonably have found, 
is highly probative of whether he acted knowingly or recklessly 
in authorizing the inaccuracies of the June 27, 1988 article to 
be republished in the July 2, 1988, follow-up article. 
The fact that all three defendants suppressed evidence from 
the July 2, 1988, article is probative of ill will, and therefore 
probative of "actual malice". 
Deliberate slanting is further evidence of a purpose to 
"get" the plaintiff and is thus probative of actual malice. 
The desire to place a plaintiff in a bad (and sensational) 
light is indicative of a state of mind conducive to acting 
in reckless disregard of the truth. This evidence of 
motive, without more, does not prove actual malice. But it 
defies logic to argue that it is not relevant. See Curtis 
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 169, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 
18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967). 
When the defendants did not refer to the letters that were 
sent out to the citizens, which would have tended to disprove 
their connotation that inferred that the plaintiff had opposed 
municipal power prior to the election to get elected, they 
certainly slanted the facts which put the plaintiff in a bad 
light. 
Therefore, the suppression of these letters is evidence that 
they were out to "get" the plaintiff and relevant as to the issue 
of "actual malice." 
5. THE DEFENDANTS WERE UNDER NO TIME RESTRAINT 
IN PREPARING THEIR STORY 
AS EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL MALICE 
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The defendants were under no time restraint in preparing 
their June 27, 1988 and July 2, 1988 articles. This was not a 
fast-breaking news story; the events at issue had occurred years, 
months, and weeks earlier. (Terry West affidavit R 349 exhibit 1 
at 10) There was no significant deadline pressure, therefore, 
the defendants had ample time to search for collaboration. 
Falsehoods uttered at leisure are more likely to be deliberate 
than those published in haste. Absence of time pressure in this 
case is evidence that the jury could fairly consider. (emphasis 
added) See Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206, 211 (7th 
Cir. 1976) (grant of summary judgment reversed; story was not 
"hot news" and "defendants were not bedeviled by an early 
deadline"; Goulwater v. Ginzburg, supra, 414 F.2d at 339; R. 
Sach, supra, at 215-16;. See also Vandenbura v. Newsweek, Inc., 
507 F.2d 1024, 1026 (5thCir. 1975) ("when the story is not "hot 
news," as is the case here, the investigation must be more 
thorough") 
6. REFUSAL TO APOLOGIZE, CORRECT OR RETRACT 
AS EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL MALICE 
Although the mere refusal to retract is not sufficient 
evidence, by itself, to prove actual malice. New York Times v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 286, 84 S.Ct. at 727, "under certain 
circumstances evidence (of a refusal by a publisher to retract a 
statement after it has been demonstrated to him to be both false 
and defamatory) . . . might be relevant in showing recklessness 
at the time the statement was published." Golden Bear Distribut-
ing Systems of Texas v. Chase revel. Inc., 708 F.2d 944, 950,(5th 
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Cir. 1983)(quoting Restatement (second) of Torts Sec. 580A 
comment d (1977). 
Concerning June article the defendants Hogun and Goodey 
refused to apologize, correct, or make a retraction, on several 
of the inaccurate statements, after notice that they were false 
(R 349 exhibit 6), and furthermore Hogun admitted that he didn't 
discuss doing so with anyone (Dep. Hogun 82 25 to 83 1-5) . The 
inference is that they were not concerned about the truth or 
falsity of their article, at least enough to investigate further 
before publishing a follow-up article (R 349 exhibit 8) 
7. KNOWLEDGE OF THE HARM LIKELY TO FOLLOW 
PUBLICATION OF THE STORY 
AS EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL MALICE 
Knowledge of the harm likely to follow publication of a 
story is relevant to whether it was published with actual malice. 
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 170, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 
1999, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967)(Warren, C.J.,concurring) ("knowledge 
of the harm that would likely result from publication of the 
article" is relevant to actual malice determination); see Mahnke 
v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 280 Minn. 328, 160 N.W.2d 1, 9-
10 (1968) ("gravity of the charges in this story was a factor to 
be considered by the jury in assessing the conduct of the 
defendant" on the issue of "actual malice"). 
The articles themselves alerted the Defendants of their 
potential harm to the plaintiff's reputation, and to the fact 
that no mayor or attorney can operate without credibility. There 
is no excuse for implying that the plaintiff filed a false 
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insurance claim or a false burglary report and that he had 
opposed municipal power to get elected without proof that these 
statements had been verified as to their accuracy. 
8. OTHER LIBEL NOT PLEAD 
AS EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL MALICE 
The June 27, 1988 and July 2, 1988 articles alleged that the 
plaintiff had "tried to get a conditional use permit pushed 
through after the regular meeting. The conditional use permit 
would have granted a beer license to a newly opened local garage 
run by a friend of West's." (R 349 exhibits 5 and 8) The 
plaintiff denied this allegation. (Terry West affidavit R 349 
exhibit 1 at #9) Ron Chandler (city manager) also denied that 
these statements were true. (dep. Ron Chandler 10 19 to 13 2) 
This allegation inferring that the plaintiff was using his 
office for the profit or advantage of another if untrue is 
defamatory. (see Am Jur2d sec. 130 at 632) 
Even though the trial court found that the statute of 
limitations had run on this libel, this libel still may be used 
as evidence of the actual malice of the defendants with regard to 
those specific allegations that were the basis of the plaintiffs 
complaint. 
The court in the case Tavoulareas v. Piro, 759 F.2d at 127, 
affirmed the district court's ruling that read, 
Evidence of libels not specifically pleaded in the com-
plaints are nonetheless admissible as to issues such as the 
"state of mind of defendants or as to some other issue 
related to those defamations pleaded specifically in the 
original complaints" (emphasis added) 
Tavoulareas v. Piro, 759 F2d 90, (D.C. Cir. 1985, three-judge 
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panel) was vacated by en bano order of the full court in 
Tavoulareas v. Piro. 817 F.2d 762 (D.C. 1987), however, this 
category of "actual malice" was not rejected in the latter case. 
CONCLUSION: "ACTUAL MALICE" 
In determining the issue of "actual malice", Judge Eves and 
the Court of Appeals were faced with the following justifiable 
inferences derived from Hogun's and Goodey's conduct, as to 
Hogun and Goodey's involvement and state of mind, prior to 
publishing the July follow-up article: 
1) that Hogun7s failure to investigate further or review 
the July follow-up article, after he had been given new 
reasons to doubt the accuracy of the June article, was 
an attempt to protect himself from suit; 
2) Goodey's allowing a follow-up article to be published 
with no new investigation, despite the appearance of 
new reasons for doubt the accuracies in the June 
article, shows reckless disregard for truth or falsity 
and demonstrates actual malice. 
3) the fact that Hogun instructed his legal counsel to 
review the follow-up article infers that he had serious 
doubts as to what Guldan might write given the alleged 
inaccuracies in the first article; 
4) after finding that the inference that the mayor had 
committed insurance fraud, and the inference that the 
mayor was using his office for the profit of a "friend" 
was found to be false, the inference is that these 
discoveries alerted Hogun and Goodey to other possible 
inaccuracies connected with the June article, and 
alerted them to the need for new re-examination or 
verification of the other alleged false statements, 
prior to republishing them the second time; 
5) that Hogun and Goody's investigation and retraction of 
the insurance story due to legal advice that it was the 
only actionable statement shows a reckless disregard 
for truth, the inference is that they only did what was 
necessary to avoid legal action, while disregarding the 
truth or falsity on the other alleged inaccuracies; 
6) that Hogun's and Goodey's failure to cause plaintiff's 
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pre-election letter to the citizens to be mentioned in 
the follow-up article was a deliberate attempt to avoid 
any indication that the initial article was erroneous; 
7) with knowledge that the source of information for the 
June article had proven to be an unreliable source in 
the past, the fact that Hogun and Goodey still allowed 
the publishing of the follow-up article, without new 
investigation, while having reasons to doubt the 
accuracy of the June article, infers their reckless 
disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual 
malice; 
8) the fact that Hogun and Goodey was under no time 
restraint in publishing the follow-up article, raises 
the inference that falsehoods uttered at leisure are 
more likely to be deliberate than those published in 
haste; 
9) Hogun and Goodey's knowledge of the harm likely to 
follow the publication of the follow-up article, after 
receiving obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy of the 
June article, infers their reckless disregard for truth 
or falsity. 
10) that Hogun would not have consulted legal counsel after 
receiving obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy of the 
June article if he did not have serious doubts as to 
the truth of the June article; 
11) and that Hogun would have stood by the first article 
without publishing West's rebuttal letter if Hogun did 
not have serious doubts as to the truth of the June 
article. 
Therefore, this Court should find that there was sufficient 
"clear and convincing" evidence, and justifiable inferences 
presented to Judge Eves and to the Court of Appeals on the issue 
of "actual malice," hence the issue of "actual malice" of the 
defendants, Don Hogun and Brent Goodey, should have been presen-
ted to the jury. 
P O I N T IV. THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT RELY UPON 
INAPPROPRIATE EVIDENCE IN FINDING A JURY ISSUE ON ACTUAL MALICE. 
First, the Defendants' investigation and retraction of only 
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the statement that the plaintiff had filed a fraudulent insurance 
claim due to legal advice that it was the only actionable 
statement, shows a reckless disregard for truth or falsity. The 
inference is that Defendants only did what was necessary to avoid 
legal action, while disregarding the truth or falsity of the 
other statements which Plaintiff alleged were defamatory and 
false. There is no indication that the defendants discussed with 
legal counsel the truth or falsity of the other statements which 
the mayor claimed were also defamatory and false, nor is there 
any indication they made inquires into them. (see R. 270 
Appendix "F", "G", and "H") 
The Utah Court of Appeals did not hold that prepublication 
consultation with legal counsel is evidence of actual malice as 
the defendant and the amicus curiae SPJ claim in their briefs. 
Prepublication consultation with legal counsel was not the issue 
under the facts of the instant case. The facts show that legal 
counsel was sought to review the June article only after the June 
article were printed and after it's statements about the 
plaintiff became suspect. (Defendants' Statement of Material 
Facts #10) 
Defendants reliance on the advice of legal counsel not to 
investigate further the statements made in the June article is 
immaterial to whether they had serious doubts as to the accuracy 
of Guldan's accusations in the June article prior to published a 
follow up article. The issue is whether the fact that they did 
"nothing" after receiving obvious reason to doubt the accuracy of 
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the June Article before published a follow-up article, shows 
reckless disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual 
malice. (R. 282, 286, and 270 Appendix "H" page 5) 
The Court of Appeals said the following in respect to this 
issue: 
Whether or not Goodey [defendants] thought that the 
appropriate response would be to publish West's letter and 
Guldan's response, are immaterial facts in determining 
whether [they] had serious doubts as to the statements' 
actual truth. Also, whether Goodey [defendants] relied on 
the advice of legal counsel in deciding not to investigate 
further is immaterial to the question of whether [they] 
personally had serious doubts as to the accuracy of Guldan's 
accusations. West, at 188. 
We reject any argument that reliance upon legal counsel 
somehow shields a defendant from a defamation suit. 
Reliance upon legal counsel simply does not figure into the 
constitutional formula created by the Supreme Court. The 
proper focus is not on a defendant's efforts to avoid legal 
liability. One's reliance upon legal advice as to what 
course of action should be followed to avoid legal 
consequences, simply does not prevent a plaintiff from 
proving that the publisher had "serious doubts" about the 
statement when it was published. West, at 188 n.9. 
The focus is not whether the defendants sought legal counsel 
prior to publishing the follow-up article to show actual malice, 
the focus of actual malice is on the defendant's attitude toward 
the truth or falsity of the publication, on the subjective 
awareness of its probable falsity, and on the actual doubts as to 
it accuracy. (not on what their attorney advised them and 
whether or not their statements were actionable) See Lawrence v. 
Bauer Publishing, 89 N.J. 451, 467-68 (1982) See also Carson v. 
Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206, 209 (7th Cir. 1976)("actual malice 
concentrates on the defendants' attitude toward the truth or 
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falsity of the material published") 
Second, in a follow-up article, when no new investigation is 
undertaken by the defendants, regarding statements in the first 
article which the defendants have been notified were false, and 
when the only thing the defendants did, despite the appearance of 
new reasons to doubt, was to print a rebuttal letter from the 
plaintiff, this shows a reckless disregard for truth on the part 
of the defendants. It is not the fact that the defendants 
published plaintiff's reply letter that is evidence of actual 
malice, it's the fact that the only thing the paper did was to 
print the plaintiff's reply letter that is evidence of actual 
malice. 
As the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has noted, 
" . . . an astonishing number of people are convicted 
of charges they deny, and the denial does not set them right 
in the public mind. A denial often leads piquancy to the 
story, and printing one would be an easy escape from 
liability, if that were all there was to it." Morgan v. 
Bulletin Co, 369 Pa. 349, 353, 85 A.2d 869, 872 (1952). See 
also Dempsey v. Time, Inc., 43 Misc.2d 754, 252 N.Y.S2d 186, 
189, aff'd, 22 A.D.2d 854, 254 N.Y.S.2d 80 (1964); Cobbs v 
Chicago Defender. 308 Ill.App. 55, 31 N.E.2d 323 (1941). 
P O I N T V: THE USE OF THE WORD MANIPULATE AS USED IN THE 
NOVEMBER 20. 1990 ARTICLE IS DEFAMATORY UNDER UTAH LAW 
Under Utah law, libel is " a malicious defamation . . . 
tending . . . to impeach the honesty, integrity, virtue or 
reputation . . . and thereby expose him to public hatred, 
contempt or ridicule." Utah Code Ann. Sec. 45-2-2 (1975). No 
general rule can be laid down defining what words are, and what 
words are not, defamatory, but each case should be decided on its 
own facts. 50 Am Jur2d 521 Sec. 8. Looking at the actual 
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statements complained as set forth in the third cause of action, 
and when read in the context of the entire November 20, 1988 
column, the statements are defamatory in that they do tend to 
"impeach the honesty, integrity, . . . or reputation" of the 
plaintiff and do tend to bring him into "public hatred, contempt 
or ridicule." 
The statements complained of, as printed in the 
defendants7 newspaper on November 20, 1988, said the following: 
How I Came to #Love# LaVerkin's Mayor. . . The problem I 
have with the two gentlemen is their repeated, and not too 
subtle, attempts to manipulate the press." . . . 
"Mr. Phillips, on several occasions, has called 
various people here at the Spectrum to reveal some "hot" tip 
about alleged improprieties by Mayor West. He has, no 
doubt, been frequently disappointed when we have not 
attempted to "nail" the mayor based on unsubstantiated 
statements or items taken out of context . . . 
You should know, Mr. West, your allegations that Mr. 
Phillips cleverly manipulates news coverage are without 
merit. It isn't that he hasn't tried. He, like you Mr. 
West, has tried, to convince us that his gospel is the true 
gospel. . ." (R 349 exhibit 9) (appendix C) (emphases added) 
Note: The statements complained of must be read in the context 
of the entire column as required by law. Cramer v. Seattle Post-
Intelligence, 723 P.2d 1195 (Wash. App 1986)(in determining 
whether publication is defamatory, article must be read as a 
whole and not in parts detached from main body); Burns v. McGraw-
Hill Broadcasting Co.. Inc.. 659 P.2d 1351, 1360 (Colo. 1983) (in 
determining whether statement is defamatory, the "entire 
published statement must be examined in context, not just the 
objectionable word or phrase") 
This article, after accusing both Terry West and Phil 
Phillips of repeated, and not to subtle, attempts to manipulate 
the press, it then said that Terry West like Mr. Phillips has 
tried to cleverly manipulate news coverage. These accusations 
are made about Mr. Phillips supported by detailed facts, all of 
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which are very defamatory if false under Utah law, and the 
detailed facts supporting the accusations about the plaintiff are 
missing. This leaves the imagination of the readers to run wild, 
wondering what the plaintiff did repeatedly to manipulate the 
press, if it wasn't the same things that the article accused Mr. 
Phillips of doing. 
The article, when read in its entirety, gives negative 
defamatory connotations about the plaintiff, while the truth 
about the plaintiff is admitted by the defendant, Don Hogun, in 
his deposition. 
MR. WEST: And what I'm saying, isn't it true that 
the only thing I've asked (you) to do is to use care 
and diligence in ascertaining the truth before you 
print rumors, unfounded allegations and lies? I've 
asked it in letters, I've asked it personally, orally. 
Isn't that true, that's all I've asked you to do? 
THE WITNESS: (Don Hogun) That's what I thought we were 
doing. 
(By Mr. West) Isn't it true that's all I've asked you 
to do? 
ANSWER: Yes. 
(dep. Don Hogun 90 1-11) 
The New Webster Encyclopedic Dictionary defines 
"Manipulate" as - n. The act of operating upon skillfully, for 
the purpose of giving a false appearance. (R 79) (appendix D) 
This definition describes what the article claims Mr Phillips had 
done. 
There is no question, that under this definition, to be 
accused of "repeated attempts to manipulate the press", would 
impeach a mayor's, or an Attorney's honesty and integrity and 
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would expose the plaintiff to public hatred, contempt or ridicu-
le. 
At the trial level, the jury in A. E. Hotchner, 551 F.2d 
910, 912 (1977) (second circuit), found the characterization of 
the plaintiff as a "manipulator" libelous, but on appeal the 
second circuit court did not make a holding on this issue since 
they decided this case on other grounds. 
The Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action should not be 
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted because the statement complained of is reasonably 
susceptible of a defamatory meaning under Utah law. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons expressed above the Utah Court of Appeal's 
decision in the West case should be affirmed. 
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